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1 Introduction
Firms’ behavior under uncertainty can be strongly affected by risk aversion. For the
case of banks, this is clearly demonstrated by the recent financial crisis, during which
big banks’ behavior changed dramatically and led to significant consequences. For
instance, inter-bank loans shrank to nearly zero after the downfall of Lehman Brothers
in 2008 and this unexpected reaction put the global financial market at a serious risk.
To understand this phenomenon, we need to know not only the qualitative features of
the impact of risk aversion, but also its magnitude. This will help us find appropriate
approaches to reduce or eliminate the undesirable effects of changes in risk aversion.
The literature has shown that firms’ risk-aversion affects the market differently
under quantity and price competition. Sandmo (1971) and Batra and Ullah (1974) first
discovered that competitive firms facing price uncertainty would reduce production.
This also holds true for monopoly firms choosing outputs (Baron 1971; Leland 1972;
Hau 2004). However, as Baron points out, the reverse holds if a monopolist faces
an uncertain quantity and chooses its price. Later researchers extended this analysis
to oligopoly and examined the impact of risk aversion under both demand and cost
uncertainty. Wambach (1999) finds that Bertrand firms selling homogeneous goods
can retain positive price margins, instead of zero, when they do not know each other’s
costs. Similarly, Cheng (2002) shows that unknown costs allow positive profits for
Bertrand firms even when their number increases to infinity, in contrast to Cournot
oligopoly.1 Asplund (2002) further examines Cournot and Bertrand duopolies with
demand uncertainty, and shows that risk aversion reduces a firm’s decision variable
(output or price) and reduces (increases) the rival’s decision if their decisions are
strategic complements (substitutes). These studies mainly focus on the qualitative
impact of risk aversion, not on its quantitative evaluation.
The quantitative evaluation of the impact of risk aversion is especially important
in asymmetric oligopolies, where the impact is complicated due to strategic interac-
tion. Without quantitative evaluation, we have little idea of how vulnerable a market
is to sudden changes in risk aversion, and cannot find effective measures to eliminate
undesirable effects. Thus we need to examine its magnitude and investigate how to
counterbalance these effects if needed. A well-known example of this counterbalanc-
ing policy is the so-called Tobin tax (Tobin 1978), which can be imposed on financial
transactions to discourage risky speculation. Following his idea the literature has stud-
ied the feasibility and optimal level of a Tobin tax (Eichengreen et al. 1995). However,
little attention has been given to risk attitude, which is closely related to the intensity
of speculation. In this paper we look for a countervailing tax in general Cournot and
Bertrand oligopolies, instead of foreign exchange or financial markets for which the
Tobin tax is usually considered.
We consider the impact of a firm’s risk aversion in linear oligopolies where firms
havemean-variance utilities.2 This simplemodel allows us to solve for the equilibrium
1 Spulber (1995) and Janssen and Rasmusen (2002) also obtain positive expected profits in Bertrand
oligopoly with unknown costs or the number of firms, respectively.
2 Since Markowitz (1952) and Tobin (1958), mean-variance utility has been well justified for quadratic
utility functions and normal distributions. It is also valid approximately for a wide variety of concave
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in closed-form while capturing risk effects on the part of firms. In addition, we deviate
from the traditional literature that assumes at the outset a standard Cournot or Bertrand
equilibrium based on firms’ fully rational decisions, which would require unrealistic
information, including knowing other firms’ risk aversion parameters. As risk aversion
is unobservable by other firms, we do not assume that firms make decisions with
such information on hand, but rather that they follow naïve learning decision rules
reflecting limited rationality.3 The equilibrium is defined as a steady state where all
firms repeat their previous decisions and their expectations are realized. We evaluate
the impacts of a firm’s risk aversion on outputs, prices, consumer surplus and social
welfare as expressed via potentially observable variables, thus excluding in particular
unobservable risk aversion.We find that these impacts are very similar but that they act
in opposite directions in Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies. In addition, they resemble
the effects of firms’ exogenous cost changes on market performance. Hence we can
offset the undesirable effects of risk aversion and even eliminate them by changing
firms’ costs with appropriate countervailing taxes.
The next section introduces our Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly models. We then
present a special case of monopoly in Sect. 3 to illustrate and contrast the different
impacts of risk aversion when the firm chooses its output versus its price. We evaluate
the impact of risk aversion in Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies in Sect. 4. Section 5
discusses the use of countervailing taxes to eliminate the undesirable effects of risk
aversion. Section 6 concludes the paper and proofs are in the Appendices.
2 The Cournot and Bertrand models
We first introduce a linear and asymmetric oligopoly model. There are n + 1 goods:
a numeraire good x0 with a price normalized to 1 and n differentiated goods grouped
in an n × 1 product vector x. Good i is produced by firm i at a constant marginal cost
ci . We denote the n × 1 cost vector by c. The representative consumer has a quadratic
utility function u = x0+a′x−0.5x′Bx, where a is a positive n×1 vector,B is an n×n
matrix. Without loss of generality, we let B be symmetric and assume it is positive
definite, so u is strictly concave in x. Denote the elements of B by bi j for all i and j .
As B is symmetric and positive definite, so is its inverse B−1. Denote the elements of
B−1 by βi j for all i and j . Diagonal elements bii > 0 and βi i > 0, but the signs of
off-diagonal elements bi j and βi j are unspecified for j = i , allowing for any mixture
of complementary and substitute goods.
Let pi be the price of good i and p be the price vector. The representative consumer
has a fixed income W and chooses a consumption bundle x to maximize her utility
given her budget constraint x0 + p′x ≤ W . We assume that W is sufficiently high so
Footnote 2 continued
(risk-averse) utility functions, as argued by Levy and Markowitz (1979) and Markowitz (2014). See also
recent reappraisals by Eichner and Wagener (2009, 2014).
3 See Herranz et al. (2015) for a case where it was possible to estimate the distribution of risk aversion
using firm data. Even when it is possible to estimate the distribution an individual firm would not have this
information.
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that an interior solution exists4. Since u is strictly concave in x, the demand vector x
can be solved from the first-order condition a − Bx − p = 0. This implies an inverse
demand function for an n-firm Cournot oligopoly as p = a − Bx, i.e.
pi = ai −
n∑
j=1
bi j x j for all i (1)
From the first-order condition a−Bx−p = 0, we can solve the direct demand function
for an n-firm Bertrand oligopoly as x = α − B−1p, where α = B−1a, i.e.
xi = αi −
n∑
j=1
βi j p j for all i (2)
Firm i’s profit is πi = xi (pi − ci ), where pi is given by (1) in Cournot oligopoly. In
Bertrand oligopoly, xi is given by (2). As firms do not know their prices or quantities,
their profits are unknown and have variance V (πi ). We assume each firm i maximizes
a mean-variance utility function, with risk aversion coefficient δi , given by
vi = E(πi ) − δi V (πi ) for all i (3)
When aCournot firmchooses xi tomaximize (3), it perceives its price pi as a random
variable with variance σ 2i . So the profit variance V (πi ) = x2i V (pi − ci ) = x2i σ 2i and
its utility function (3) becomes xi E(pi − ci )− δiσ 2i x2i . When a Bertrand firm chooses
pi to maximize (3), it perceives its quantity xi as a random variable with variance ρ2i .
The profit variance V (πi ) = (pi − ci )2V (xi ) = (pi − ci )2ρ2i , and its utility function
(3) becomes (pi − ci )E(xi ) − δiρ2i (pi − ci )2.
The literature usually evaluates the impact of risk aversion on the Cournot-Nash
or Bertrand-Nash equilibrium outcomes. The implicit assumption then is that firms
know their own and rivals’ profit functions and risk aversion parameters. This is rather
unrealistic especially in an asymmetric oligopoly where firms should not know each
other’s risk aversion. Instead we assume that firms choose their output quantities or
prices in each period t with limited information and their decisions converge to an
equilibrium through a learning process. Firms do not know rivals’ demand, costs and
risk aversion, and cannot anticipate their decisions. Moreover, they do not know their
own demand functions precisely, including key parameters such as ai and αi , which
may be the source of demand uncertainty. A firm knows only the slope of its demand
curve, bii or βi i , its own cost ci , risk aversion δi , the previous price and quantity, pit−1
and xit−1, and variance σ 2i or ρ2i . Given this limited information each firm follows a
simple rule to choose xit or pit to maximize (3).
As a reflection of bounded-rationality, an equilibriumhere is defined as a steady state
where all firms repeat their previous decisions and their expected prices or demands
are realized. While this steady state turns out to be identical to the Nash equilibrium
outcome used in the literature, it is achieved through a repeated simple adjustment
4 While B’s positive definiteness is a necessary condition for our linear demand, a sufficient income W
may not hold when goods are complements and the determinant |B| is close to zero [see Amir et al. (2015)].
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process based on realistic information, either in quantities or in prices, rather than by
firms’ rational decisions based on complete and far-reaching information, including
rivals’ risk aversion parameters.
In the next section we first present a special case of oligopoly with n = 1, i.e.
monopoly. It serves as an example for our general Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies.
Without strategic interaction, amonopolyfirmcan easily find its optimal price or output
with limited information.Wewill show that the impacts of risk aversion go in opposite
directions when the firm chooses price and output, as pointed out by Baron (1971).
Given our linear model, we can precisely determine the impact of a monopolist’s risk
aversion on its output, price, consumer surplus and social welfare. We then extend our
result from a single-good monopoly to a multi-product monopoly.
3 Monopoly
In this section we use the simple case of monopoly to illustrate some of the main ideas
of the paper without taking into account strategic interaction among firms. We show
the opposite impacts of risk aversion on market performance when the firm chooses
its quantity versus its price.
3.1 Quantity setting monopoly
We first consider a special case of our Cournot oligopoly model with n = 1, i.e. a
quantity setting monopoly. In this case the inverse demand function (1) in period t
reduces to pt = a − bxt , and the profit πt = xt (pt − c). As V (πt ) = x2t σ 2, the utility
function (3) becomes vt = xt E(pt − c) − δx2t σ 2. The first-order condition for xt to
maximize vt is E(pt ) − c− bxt − 2δxtσ 2 = 0. The best estimate of pt is to adjust its
previous price by the change in output, i.e. E(pt ) = pt−1 −b(xt − xt−1). Substituting
this into the first-order condition, we have pt−1−b(xt −xt−1)−c−bxt −2δxtσ 2 = 0.
Thus, based on this limited information, the monopolist should choose its output to
be xt = pt−1−c+bxt−12(b+δσ 2) . Since pt−1 = a − bxt−1, xt must be equal to the optimal
output x = a−c
2(b+δσ 2) , which indeed maximizes vt , even though the monopolist may
not directly observe the value of a.
Then we can evaluate the impact of risk aversion on the output, price, social welfare
and consumer surplus. The impact on the output is ∂x
∂δ
= − (a−c)σ 2
2(b+δσ 2)2 < 0. From the
inverse demand p = a − bx , we have ∂p
∂δ
= −b ∂x
∂δ
> 0. Moreover, as social welfare
(SW) is equal to (a−c)x−0.5bx2, we get ∂SW
∂δ
= (a−c−bx) ∂x
∂δ
= (p−c) ∂x
∂δ
< 0. As
consumer surplus is equal to 0.5bx2, we find ∂CS
∂δ
= bx ∂x
∂δ
< 0. Hence risk aversion
in a quantity setting monopoly harms both consumers and society.
We also find that ∂SW
∂δ
+ ∂CS
∂δ
= (p − c + bx) ∂x
∂δ
= (a − c) ∂x
∂δ
= − (a−c)2σ 2
2(b+δσ 2)2 =
−2x2σ 2 = −2V (π). So the negative impact of risk aversion on the sum of consumer
surplus and social welfare is exactly twice the profit variance. Surprisingly, this simple
result also holds in a multi-product monopoly.
Now we extend the single-good monopoly to a monopolist selling n differentiated
products as described in our oligopolymodel. Then themonopolist total profit becomes
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π = (p−c)′x. The quantity settingmonopolist faces an uncertain price vector pwhose
n × n variance and covariance matrix Cov(p) ≡ , which must be symmetric and
positive definite. So the variance of profit V (π) = x′x, and the objective function
(3) becomes
vt = x′t E(pt − c) − δx′txt (3’)
The first-order condition for xt tomaximize (3′) is E(pt )−c−Bxt−2δxt = 0. The
monopolist may estimate E(pt ) = pt−1−B(xt−xt−1). SincematrixB+δ is positive
definite, we can solve the optimal output in period t, xt = 0.5(B + δ)−1(pt−1 −
c + Bxt−1). As pt−1 = a − Bxt−1, xt must be equal to the true optimal output
x = 0.5(B + δ)−1(a − c). When δ = 0, the multi-product monopoly output x =
0.5B−1(a − c), which is equal to half the socially optimal quantity, as obtained by
Amir et al. (2016).
Given this result, we can evaluate the impact of risk aversion on outputs, prices,
social welfare and consumer surplus. However, for simplicity, we only present the
effect on the sum of social welfare and consumer surplus (see “Appendix 1”).
Proposition 1 In a quantity settingmulti-product monopoly, the effect of risk aversion
on the sum of social welfare and consumer surplus, ∂SW
∂δ
+ ∂CS
∂δ
= −2V (π).
Hence the simple result from a single-good monopoly holds in a multi-product
monopoly. We will show a similar result in our Cournot oligopoly in Sect. 4.
3.2 Price setting monopoly
Similarly, we consider a case of Bertrand oligopoly with n = 1, i.e. a price setting
monopolist. In this case the demand function (2) in period t reduces to xt = (a− pt )/b,
and the profit πt = xt (pt − c). As V (πt ) = (pt − c)2ρ2, the utility function (3) is
equal to vt = (pt − c)E(xt ) − (pt − c)2δρ2. Then the first-order condition for pt to
maximize vt is E(xt ) − (pt − c)/b − 2(pt − c)δρ2 = 0. The best estimate of xt is to
adjust its previous quantity by a change in its price, i.e. E(xt ) = xt−1 − (pt − pt−1)/b.
Substitute this into the first-order condition, we have xt−1 − (pt − pt−1)/b − (pt −
c)/b − 2(pt − c)δρ2 = 0. Thus, based on the limited information, the monopolist
should choose its price as pt = c + bxt−1+pt−1−c2(1+δbρ2) . As xt−1 = (a − pt−1)/b, pt must
be equal to the optimal price p = c + a−c
2(1+δbρ2) , which maximizes the utility vt , even
though the monopolist may not observe the value of a.
Again we evaluate the impact of risk aversion on the output, price, social welfare
and consumer surplus. The impact on the price is ∂p
∂δ
= − (a−c)bρ2
2(1+δbρ2)2 < 0. As the output
x = a−pb , we have ∂x∂δ = − 1b ∂p∂δ > 0. Moreover, as social welfare is (a−c)x−0.5bx2,
we get ∂SW
∂δ
= (p − c) ∂x
∂δ
> 0. As consumer surplus is 0.5bx2, ∂CS
∂δ
= bx ∂x
∂δ
> 0.
Hence, risk aversion by a price setting monopolist benefits consumers and the society.
We also obtain ∂SW
∂δ
+ ∂CS
∂δ
= (a − c) ∂x
∂δ
= − a−cb ∂p∂δ = (a−c)
2ρ2
2(1+δbρ2)2 , which is
equal to 2(p − c)2ρ2 = 2V (π). So the positive impact of risk aversion on the
sum of consumer surplus and social welfare is twice the profit variance, exactly
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opposite to the quantity-setting monopolist. This result also holds in a multi-product
monopoly.
We now extend the single-goodmonopolist problem to amulti-product monopolist.
The total profit is still π = (p − c)′x. The price setting monopolist faces an uncertain
output vector x, whose n×n variance and covariance matrix Cov(x) ≡ , which must
be symmetric and positive definite. So the profit variance V (π) = (p − c)′(p − c),
and the objective function (3) becomes:
vt = (pt − c)′E(xt ) − δ(pt − c)′(pt − c) (3”)
The first-order condition tomaximize (3”) is E(xt )−B−1(pt−c)−2δ(pt−c) = 0.
The monopolist may estimate E(xt ) = xt−1−B−1(pt −pt−1). Since matrixB−1+δ
is positive definite, the optimal price pt = c+0.5(B−1+δ)−1[xt−1+B−1(pt−1−c)].
As pt−1 = a − Bxt−1, pt must be equal to the true optimal price p = c + 0.5(I +
δB)−1(a − c). If δ = 0, we get p = 0.5(a + c), i.e. all monopoly prices are
independent of each other, a result obtained in Amir et al. (2016). With risk aversion,
the price independence breaks down even if all quantities demanded are uncorrelated,
i.e. when  is diagonal.
Given the optimal prices, we can evaluate the impact of risk aversion on outputs,
prices, social welfare and consumer surplus. However, for simplicity, we only present
the effect on the sum of social welfare and consumer surplus (see “Appendix 2”).
Proposition 2 In a price setting multi-product monopoly, the effect of risk aversion
on the sum of social welfare and consumer surplus is ∂SW
∂δ
+ ∂CS
∂δ
= 2V (π).
Hence the simple result from a single-good monopoly again holds in a price setting
multi-product monopoly. We will show a similar result in Bertrand oligopoly.
The impacts of risk aversion can be expressed in similar functional forms but with
opposite signs in quantity and price monopoly settings. If quantity is the firm’s choice
variable, risk aversion tends to reduce competiveness. In contrast, if the firm chooses
price, risk aversion tends to increase competiveness.
The impact of risk aversion ismore complex in oligopoly due to strategic interaction.
We will deal with this issue below.
4 Oligopoly
Based on the insights derived in the case of monopoly, we will examine the impact of
risk aversion in Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies in this section. The Cournot model
will resemble the case of a quantity-setting monopolist, while the Bertrand model
follows the case of price setting. The effects of risk aversion will be qualitatively
similar to the corresponding monopoly cases, but their magnitudes will be affected by
strategic considerations.With limited information, firms cannot choose the equilibrium
strategy based on the knowledge of risk aversion and other information. We present a
simple and naïve decision rule, similar to that in the monopoly case, under which play
converges to the equilibrium gradually. We evaluate the impacts of the risk aversion
parameters δi on outputs, prices, consumer surplus and social welfare. Given the firms’
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asymmetry in demand, costs and risk attitude, we cannot obtain clear-cut solutions as
in the monopoly case. Nonetheless we will express the impacts of risk aversion via
potentially observable variables, rather than unobservable risk aversion. Without loss
of generality, we consider the impacts of firm 1’s risk aversion δ1, and show that they
are closely linked to the corresponding effects of its cost changes.
4.1 Cournot oligopoly
The literature has shown that both monopoly and duopoly markets become less com-
petitive when firms face uncertain prices and choose quantities. We will evaluate the
impact of a firm’s risk aversion quantitatively in an asymmetric Cournot oligopoly.
We assume that each firm i chooses its output xit in period t to maximize its mean-
variance utility xit E(pit −ci )−δiσ 2i x2i t , without knowing rivals’ risk aversion as well
as their demand and cost conditions. The first-order condition for xit is
E(pit ) − ci − bii xit − 2δiσ 2i xi t = 0 for all i (4)
Its optimal output xit should depend on its price expectation E(pit ). However,
unable to anticipate rivals’ decisions, its best price estimate is to adjust its previous
price by its own output change, i.e. E(pit ) = pit−1 − bii (xit − xit−1). Substituting
this into (4), we have pit−1 − bii (xit − xit−1) − ci − bii xit − 2δiσ 2i xi t = 0. So the
optimal output is
xit = pit−1 − ci + bii xit−1
2(bii + δiσ 2i )
for all i (5)
When every firm follows (5), it is not guaranteed that the output is truly optimal
immediately as in themonopoly case.Asfirms adjust outputs in each period, themarket
may converge. The equilibrium is defined as a steady state where each firm repeats its
decision, i.e. xit = xit−1 and its price expectation is realized, i.e. E(pit ) = pit . We
denote firm i’s equilibrium output and price by xi and pi . Then (4) becomes:
(bii + 2δiσ 2i )xi = ai −
∑n
j=1 bi j x j − ci for all i (6)
In fact Eq. (6) is identical to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium condition with complete
information. So our steady state coincides with the Nash equilibrium, but is obtained
through quantity adjustments with realistic limited information, not by rational antic-
ipation of rivals’ actions. We can write (6) as Hx = a − Bx − c, where H is an n × n
diagonal matrix whose i-th diagonal element hii = bii + 2δiσ 2i . As H + B is positive
definite and its inverse exists, we can solve the Cournot equilibrium output vector as:
x = (H + B)−1(a − c) (7)
Now we examine how δ1 affects the equilibrium outputs and prices. We try to
express these effects via observable variables, rather than unobservable risk aversion.
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When δ1 changes, firm 1 will first adjust x1 according to (5). This will affect other
firms’ prices and cause their responses. A new equilibrium will be reached through
this process of output adjustments. We examine how the final outcome determined by
(7) responds to the change in δ1. In an asymmetric oligopoly, the responses
∂xi
∂δ1
and
∂pi
∂δ1
are rather complex. Nonetheless we can express them via potentially observable
variables, such as firm i’s output and price responses to firm 1’s cost c1,
∂xi
∂c1
and ∂pi
∂c1
.
Proposition 3 In a Cournot oligopoly the effects of firm 1’s risk aversion on each
firm’s output and price are:
∂xi
∂δ1
= 2V (π1)
x1
∂xi
∂c1
,
∂pi
∂δ1
= 2V (π1)
x1
∂pi
∂c1
.
Proof See “Appendix 3”. unionsq
So the impact of δ1 on every firm’s output and price is proportional to the output
and price responses to firm 1’s cost change, and its profit variance per output unit.
These are observable variables and can potentially be estimated with data, unlike the
unobservable risk aversion parameter. Using Eq. (7), we can see that − ∂xi
∂c1
is equal
to the i-th element of the first row in (H + B)−1. From (6) we see pi = ci + hii xi .
So we have ∂p1
∂c1
= 1 + h11 ∂x1∂c1 and
∂pi
∂c1
= hii ∂xi∂c1 for i = 1. Moreover, from (7) we
can determine the signs of ∂x1
∂c1
and ∂p1
∂c1
. Since matrix (H + B)−1 is positive definite,
its diagonal elements are positive, so we have ∂x1
∂c1
< 0. It can also be shown that we
always have ∂p1
∂c1
> 0. We cannot determine the sign of ∂xi
∂c1
for i = 1 in general, but if
goods are complements, we have ∂xi
∂c1
< 0.
Given Proposition 3, we evaluate the impact of δ1 on consumer surplus (CS) and
social welfare (SW). The latter is the sum of consumer surplus and total profit of
all firms, i.e. SW = u − c′x − x0 = (a − c)′x − 0.5x′Bx. Consumer surplus is
u − p′x − x0. As p = a − Bx, we have CS = 0.5x’Bx. Although both are complex
functions in asymmetric Cournot oligopoly, we can again express the welfare effects
of risk aversion via observable variables. Similar to the impact on outputs and prices,
the welfare effects are proportional to V (π1)x1 , and also depend on the effect of firm 1’s
cost on the total profit, i.e. ∂π
∂c1
.
Proposition 4 In a Cournot oligopoly the effects of firm 1’s risk aversion on social
welfare and consumer surplus are:
∂SW
∂δ1
= V (π1)
x1
∂π
∂c1
,
∂CS
∂δ1
= −V (π1)
(
2 + 1
x1
∂π
∂c1
)
.
Proof See “Appendix 4”. unionsq
If we know how firm 1’s cost affects total profit, we can estimate the welfare effect
of δ1. When c1 rises, the direct impact on π is −x1, only affecting firm 1. Then
firm 1 will adjust its output according to (5), and other firms will follow. Usually
the total profit falls when c1 rises, and the welfare effect is negative. Consumers are
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usually worse off since it is likely that ∂π
∂c1
> −2x1. Proposition 4 also implies that
∂π
∂δ1
= ∂SW
∂δ1
− ∂CS
∂δ1
= 2V (π1)(1+ 1x1 ∂π∂c1 ), which is negative if and only if ∂π∂c1 < −x1.
Furthermore we can find the impact of δ1 on the sum of social welfare and consumer
surplus. Adding the effects on social welfare and consumer surplus together we get:
Corollary 1 In a Cournot oligopoly the effect of firm 1’s risk aversion on the sum of
social welfare and consumer surplus is: ∂SW
∂δ1
+ ∂CS
∂δ1
= −2V (π1).
Similar to the quantity setting monopoly case, risk aversion always decreases the
sum of social welfare and consumer surplus, by twice the profit variance. This result
indicates a lower competitiveness of the oligopoly market.5 Both social welfare and
consumer surplus are widely used in antitrust and competition policies, as well as
in broader contexts. Equivalently, as the sum is equal to (a − c)′x, we may view it
as a measure of total output, weighted by vector a − c. In this sense, risk aversion
always has a negative and precise effect on competitiveness in an asymmetric Cournot
oligopoly.
4.2 Bertrand oligopoly
The literature has shown that both monopoly and duopoly markets becomemore com-
petitive when firms face uncertain demands and choose prices. We will quantitatively
evaluate the impact of a firm’s risk aversion in an asymmetric Bertrand oligopoly.
Given an uncertain quantity demanded, a Bertrand firm’s mean-variance utility func-
tion in period t is equal to (pit − ci )E(xit ) − δiρ2i (pit − ci )2. When a firm chooses
its price pit to maximize this utility, the first-order condition for the optimal price is:
E(xit ) − βi i (pit − ci ) − 2δiρ2i (pi − ci ) = 0 for all i (8)
Similar to the Cournot case, we assume each firm cannot anticipate other firms’
decisions and does not know its own demand function except for the slope. Each firm
can only estimate its quantity demanded xit based on the previous quantity xit−1 and
its own price change from the last period, i.e. E(xit ) = xit−1 − βi i (pit − pit−1).
Substituting this into the first-order condition (8), we can solve for the optimal naïve
price strategy6
pit = ci + xit−1 + βi i (pit−1 − ci )
2(βi i + δiρ2i )
for all i (9)
As in the Cournot case, the equilibrium is defined as a steady state where each
firm repeats its price, i.e. pit = pit−1 and its quantity expectation is realized, i.e.
E(xit ) = xit .We denote the equilibriumprice and output by pi and xi . So (8) becomes:
5 When comparing Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies, Amir and Jin (2001) use the sum of consumer
surplus and social welfare to indicate market competitiveness.
6 This pricing rule is similar to that used in Jin (2001) except for the risk aversion, and will converge to
the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium under reasonable conditions.
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(
βi i + 2δiρ2i
)
(pi − ci ) = xi for all i (10)
Equation (10) is again identical to the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium condition with
complete information. Our steady state coincides with the Bertrand equilibrium but
is obtained through price adjustments with limited information, not by rational antic-
ipation of rivals’ actions. We can write (10) as p − c = Gx, where G is an n × n
diagonal matrix whose i-th diagonal element gii = 1
βi i+2δiρ2i
. As p = a − Bx, we
have Gx = a − Bx − c. As G + B is positive definite, the Bertrand equilibrium price
can be solved as
x = (G + B)−1(a − c) (11)
When δ1 changes, firm 1 will first adjust p1 according to (9). This will cause other
firms’ responses and a newequilibriumwill be reached through the adjustment process.
Given (11) we can evaluate the impact of δ1 on outputs and prices. Equation (11) has
the same form as (7) except for G replacing H. Similar to the Cournot case, we can
express these impacts via observable variables, such as output and price responses to
a change in c1, i.e.
∂xi
∂c1
,
∂pi
∂c1
and V (π1)x1 . The only major difference between Cournot
and Bertrand oligopolies is the opposite signs (see “Appendix 5”).
Proposition 5 In a Bertrand oligopoly the effects of firm 1’s risk aversion on each
firm’s output and price are respectively
∂xi
∂δ1
= −2V (π1)
x1
∂xi
∂c1
,
∂pi
∂δ1
= −2V (π1)
x1
∂pi
∂c1
.
Here we obtain almost opposite results to the Cournot case. However themagnitude
of ∂xi
∂c1
differs from that in Cournot oligopoly. From (11) we see that − ∂xi
∂c1
is equal to
the i-th element of the first row in (G+B)−1. It follows from (10) that pi = ci +gii xi .
So we get ∂p1
∂c1
= 1 + g11 ∂x1∂c1 and
∂pi
∂c1
= gii ∂xi∂c1 for i = 1. Moreover we always have
∂xi
∂c1
< 0 asmatrixG +B is positive definite. Likewise we have ∂p1
∂c1
> 0. If all goods are
substitutes, we can show that ∂pi
∂c1
> 0. In a symmetric case, ∂xi
∂c1
and ∂pi
∂c1
must have the
same signs in both Cournot and Bertrand cases despite their difference in magnitude.
This implies opposite signs for ∂xi
∂δ1
and ∂pi
∂δ1
under quantity and price competition.
This contrast between Cournot and Bertrand cases extends the findings in the earlier
literature.
Given Proposition 5, the impacts of a firm’s risk aversion on social welfare and
consumer surplus in Bertrand oligopoly are also similar to those in Cournot oligopoly.
The proof is essentially identical to the Cournot case except for replacing matrix H
by G, and Eq. (7) by (11). The only difference is the opposite signs, obtained in
Proposition 6, in comparison to those in Proposition 4.
Proposition 6 In a Bertrand oligopoly, the effects of firm 1’s risk aversion on social
welfare and consumer surplus are respectively
∂SW
∂δ1
= −V (π1)
x1
∂π
∂c1
,
∂CS
∂δ1
= V (π1)
(
2 + 1
x1
∂π
∂c1
)
.
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Similar to the Cournot case, when c1 changes, the direct impact on π is −x1, only
affecting firm 1. Then firm 1 will adjust its price according to (9), and other firms will
follow. The welfare effect is likely to be positive since the total profit usually falls with
c1. Consumers are likely to be better off as ∂π∂c1 > −2x1 usually. FromProposition 6we
also obtain ∂π
∂δ1
= −2V (π1)(1+ 1x1 ∂π∂c1 ), which is negative if and only if ∂π∂c1 > −x1. A
similar effect on the sum of consumer surplus and social welfare in the Cournot case
also applies.
Corollary 2 In a Bertrand oligopoly the effect of firm 1’s risk aversion on the sum of
social welfare and consumer surplus is: ∂SW
∂δ1
+ ∂CS
∂δ1
= 2V (π1).
Opposite to theCournot case and similar to the price settingmonopoly, risk aversion
tends to make the market more competitive, and always raises the sum of consumer
surplus and social welfare. Here we see a strong contrast between asymmetric Cournot
and Bertrand oligopolies, as the literature found in symmetric cases. Furthermore, we
may consider the risk factor δ1V (π1) denoted by r1. A change in r1 is equal to a change
in δ1 multiplied by V (π1). ThenCorollaries 1 and 2 can bewritten as ∂SW∂r1 + ∂CS∂r1 = −2
and 2 in Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies respectively.
At this stage it is appropriate to compare and distinguish the differences due to mar-
ket structure (oligopoly and monopoly) and those due to quantity setting versus price
setting. Since the quantity (price) setting monopoly is a special case of our Cournot
(Bertrand) oligopoly, so is the result. The impact of risk aversion is qualitatively dif-
ferent when firms choose quantities or prices, as shown by the opposite signs. While
these opposite impacts in the quantity and price setting monopolies are carried over
to the more complicated Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies, the similar expressions
such as ∂xi
∂c1
and ∂pi
∂c1
have different values due to strategic interaction in oligopolies.
They are also different in Cournot and Bertrand competition due to different strategic
interactions.
In spite of the different magnitudes of the impacts of risk aversion, it is surprising
that we obtain almost identical expressions for these impacts. This fact allows us to
design a relatively simple tax policy to reduce or eliminate the undesirable effects
of risk aversion. Next we show how tax policy may counterbalance the effect of risk
aversion.
5 Countervailing taxes
In the previous sections we focus on the impact of risk aversion on market compet-
itiveness. On the other hand risk aversion affects firms’ bankruptcy risk due to their
behavioral changes as mentioned in the introduction. In Cournot oligopoly, these two
effects work against each other. More risk aversion on the part of firms makes the
market less competitive but less risky; while less risk aversion makes the market more
competitive but riskier. In Bertrand oligopoly the two effects move together. More
risk aversion increases the competiveness and reduces the risk, while less risk aver-
sion would reduce competitiveness and also raise the risk. Hence a tax policy may be
needed to correct undesirable effects of risk aversion in both markets. In this section
we will use our earlier results to obtain these countervailing taxes in Cournot and
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Bertrand oligopolies, which also applies to the cases of a quantity or price setting
monopoly.
Given previous results, we see that the impact of a firm’s risk aversion can be
expressed as a change in its cost. We assume the current cost c1 includes a unit tax.
Then a cost change can be caused by a tax change. In Cournot oligopoly, an increase
in δ1 is equivalent to a certain increase in c1. This cost change can be offset by the
same amount of tax reduction on firm 1’s product. Hence, the impact of risk aversion
can be offset by an equivalent tax change. This simple relation can be explained more
accurately by our equilibrium condition (6) for i = 1. With Δδ1 > 0, the left hand
side of (6) rises by 2σ 21 x1Δδ1. If we reduce the tax (hence lower c1) by 2
V (π1)
x1
Δδ1
on the right hand side, (6) remains valid and the equilibrium will not change. Hence
a tax reduction of Δt1 = −2 V (π1)x1 Δδ1 can exactly cancel the change of risk aversion
Δδ1 > 0.
In Bertrand oligopoly, the impact of a decrease in δ1 is equivalent to a certain rise in
c1. To eliminate the impact ofΔδ1 < 0, we should again lower the unit tax. This can be
seen in our equilibrium condition (10) for i = 1. With Δδ1 < 0, the left hand side of
(10) falls by 2ρ21 (p1−c1)Δδ1. Ifwe lower c1 by a tax reduction ofΔt1, the left hand side
will rise by −(β11 + 2δ1ρ21 )Δt1. When (β11 + 2δ1ρ21 )Δt1 = 2ρ21 (p1 − c1)Δδ1, these
two effects will cancel each other out, and (10) will remain valid, so the equilibrium
will not change. Using (10) we get Δt1 = 2ρ
2
1 (p1−c1)2
x1
Δδ1 = 2 V (π1)x1 Δδ1. This is the
countervailing tax reduction to Δδ1 < 0 in Bertrand oligopoly.
Proposition 7 To eliminate the impact of Δδ1 > (<)0 in Cournot (Bertrand)
oligopoly, we should reduce unit tax on firm 1’s product by 2 V (π1)x1 Δδ1.
As we have shown, the countervailing tax for firm 1’s risk aversion cancels out
its incentive distortion, without direct impacts on other firms. If other firms’ risk
aversion also changes, the only thing we need to do is to adjust taxes on their prod-
ucts. This simple tax rule is independent of how products are related, i.e., whether
they are substitutes or complements. It is thus feasible to reduce or eliminate the
undesirable impacts of risk aversion even in complicated Cournot and Bertrand
markets.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we quantitatively evaluate the impact of a firm’s risk aversion on out-
puts, prices, consumer surplus and social welfare.We can quantitatively estimate these
effects based on observable variables, excluding unobservable risk aversion. In partic-
ular, these impacts are closely linked to the effects of a firm’s cost change. Thus suitable
tax policymay offset these effects by changing firms’ costs.We suggest countervailing
unit taxes to eliminate the undesirable effects of risk aversion.
Hopefully these findings can enhance our understanding of the impact of risk aver-
sion, especially the distinction between Cournot and Bertrand markets. For instance,
one can argue that an inter-bank loan market is close to a Cournot oligopoly, as banks
offer homogeneous goods and face severe competition. Consequently they can hardly
choose their interest rates, but only choose quantities of their loans. In this case an
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increase of banks’ risk aversion will reduce the amount of loans offered and push
the interest rate up. On the other hand, competition among supermarkets may consti-
tute the opposite case, where sellers choose prices and consumers decide how much
to buy, as in a Bertrand oligopoly. Less risk aversion will raise prices, reduce mar-
ket competiveness and also raise the bankruptcy risk. In these cases we may need
policy intervention to eliminate undesirable impacts and maintain a balance between
market efficiency and stability. Our findings may also provide support for the Tobin
tax. For instance, when financial managers become less risk averse, loan quantities
tend to increase and default risk rises. If the government raises a Tobin tax as the
countervailing measure, over-speculation may be prevented.
While the advantage of this paper is to allow arbitrary product relations and any
number of firms, its lack of generality is to restrict demand and cost functions to be
linear and to postulate firms’ utility functions to be of the mean-variance type. These
assumptions allow us to solve the equilibrium prices and outputs explicitly and thereby
derive precise quantitative insights. When firms’ utility functions are more complex,
or demand and cost functions are nonlinear, closed-form solutions are generally not
obtainable. If these functions are relatively smooth, our linear models can serve as
approximations, and the results presented here may end up close to the true optimal
solutions. But this may not apply to highly nonlinear functions. Further research may
reveal the extent to which the conclusions derived here can be extended to these
cases.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
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Appendix 1 (Proof for Proposition 1)
Differentiating SW + CS = (a − c)′x we obtain ∂(SW+CS)
∂δ
= (a − c)′ ∂x
∂δ
.
To find ∂x
∂δ
given x = 0.5(B + δ)−1(a − c), we first write
[B + (δ + Δδ)]−1 − (B + δ)−1
= [B + (δ + Δδ)]−1[B + δ − B − (δ + Δδ)](B + δ)−1
= −[B + (δ + Δδ)]−1Δδ(B + δ)−1.
Divide it by Δδ and let Δδ → 0, we then obtain
∂x
∂δ
= −0.5(B + δ)−1(B + δ)−1(a − c) = −(B + δ)−1x.
So ∂(SW+CS)
∂δ
= (a − c)′ ∂x
∂δ
= −(a − c)′(B + δ)−1x = −2x′x = −2V (π).
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Appendix 2 (Proof for Proposition 2)
As x = B−1(a − p), ∂x
∂δ
= −B−1 ∂p
∂δ
, we have ∂(SW+CS)
∂δ
= (a − c)′ ∂x
∂δ
= −(a − c)′B−1 ∂p
∂δ
.
Given p = c + 0.5(I + δB)−1(a − c), we write
[I + (δ + Δδ)B]−1 − (I + δB)−1
= [I + (δ + Δδ)B]−1[I + δB − I − (δ + Δδ)B](I + δB)−1
= −[I + (δ + Δδ)B]−1ΔδB(I + δB)−1.
Divide it byΔδ and letΔδ → 0,we have ∂p
∂δ
= −0.5(I+δB)−1B(I+δB)−1(a −
c) = −(I + δB)−1B(p − c). Hence we find
∂(SW + CS)
∂δ
= (a − c)′ ∂x
∂δ
= (a − c)′B−1(I + δB)−1B(p − c)
= (a − c)′(B + δBB)−1B(p − c) = (a − c)′(I + δB)−1(p − c)
= 2(p − c)′(p − c) = 2V (π).
Appendix 3 (Proof for Proposition 3)
We write the Eq. (6) as (B + H)x = a − c. Differentiate it with respect to δ1. The
derivative of B + H is zero except for the first diagonal of 2σ 21 . Let ι be an n×1 vector
with all elements 0 except for the 1st being 1. So we have 2σ 21 x1ι + (B + H) ∂x∂δ1 = 0.
Hence we find ∂x
∂δ1
= −2σ 21 x1(B + H)−1ι = −2σ 21 x1(B + H)−11 .
From (7), we have -(B+H)−11 = ∂x∂c1 . So we obtain ∂x∂δ1 = 2σ 21 x1 ∂x∂c1 = 2 V (π1)x1 ∂x∂c1 .
Given p = a − Bx, we have ∂p
∂δ1
= −B ∂x
∂δ1
. Moreover, since we have ∂p
∂c1
= −B ∂x
∂c1
and ∂x
∂δ1
= 2 V (π1)x1 ∂x∂c1 , we obtain
∂p
∂δ1
= −2 V (π1)x1 B ∂x∂c1 = 2 V (π1)x1
∂p
∂c1
.
Appendix 4 (Proof for Proposition 4)
Differentiate SW = (a − c)′x − 0.5x′Bx with respect to δ1, we get ∂SW∂δ1 = (a − c −
Bx)′ ∂x
∂δ1
. Since Bx = a − p, we have ∂SW
∂δ1
= (p − c)′ ∂x
∂δ1
= 2 V (π1)x1 (p − c)′ ∂x∂c1 .
Now we need to show that 2(p − c)′ ∂x
∂c1
= ∂π
∂c1
.
Asπ = (p−c)′x andp = a−Bx, ∂π
∂c1
= (p−c−Bx)′ ∂x
∂c1
−x1 = (2p−c−a)′ ∂x∂c1 −x1.
It suffices to show (c − a)′ ∂x
∂c1
= x1. This holds as (7) implies ∂x∂c1 = −(B + H)−11 .
Hence we have 2(p − c)′ ∂x
∂c1
= ∂π
∂c1
, and thus ∂SW
∂δ1
= V (π1)x1 ∂π∂c1 .
Then we write CS as 0.5x′Bx = (a − c)′x − SW . So ∂CS
∂δ1
= (a − c)′ ∂x
∂δ1
− ∂SW
∂δ1
.
As ∂x
∂δ1
= 2 V (π1)x1 ∂x∂c1 and (c − a)′ ∂x∂c1 = x1, ∂CS∂δ1 = −2V (π1) − ∂SW∂δ1 = −V (π1)(2 +
1
x1
∂π
∂c1
).
123
J. Y. Jin, S. Kobayashi
Appendix 5 (Proof for Proposition 5)
Wewrite (11) as (B+G)x= a−c, and differentiate it with respect to δ1. The derivative
of matrix B + G is all zero except for the first diagonal element being − 2ρ21
(β11+2δ1ρ21)2
.
So we get − 2ρ21 x1
(β11+2δ1ρ21)2
ι + (B + G) ∂x
∂δ1
= 0.
Hence we find ∂x
∂δ1
= 2ρ21 x1
(β11+2δ1ρ21 )2
(B + H)−1ι.
(11) implies (B + H)−1ι = (B + H)−11 = − ∂x∂c1 and (10) implies β11 + 2δ1ρ21 =
x1
p1−c1 .
So we find ∂x
∂δ1
= −2ρ21 (p1−c1)
2
x1
∂x
∂c1
= −2 V (π1)x1 ∂x∂c1 .
Also, as p= a − Bx, we have ∂p
∂δ1
= −B ∂x
∂δ1
= 2 V (π1)x1 B ∂x∂c1 = −2 V (π1)x1
∂p
∂c1
.
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